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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez is not generally considered an equality
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law decision.1 Rather, Snapp is known as a seminal case on state standing
to sue in federal court, one cited in support of state standing in litigation
about climate change,2 federal immigration policy,3 and government
ethics,4 to name a few high profile examples. At its heart, however, Snapp
is a case about equality. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued Virginia
apple growers, alleging that they had violated two federal laws by
discriminating against Puerto Rican workers.5 The Court reasoned that a
state has a judicially cognizable interest “in securing residents from the
harmful effects of discrimination,” and treated the Commonwealth like a
state, holding that it had parens patriae standing to sue to protect its
residents.6
State standing for equality complicates two typical stories about the
relationship between constitutional structure and individual rights. The
first is about equality law. In a typical telling, state sovereignty is a barrier
to achieving equal protection.7 The structure of federalism is opposed to
the realization of civil rights. This tale is well-founded.8 Slavery and Jim
Crow segregation may be the most familiar examples,9 but they are not the
only, or the most recent, examples of opposition between state sovereignty
and equality law.10 Even so, state standing for equality suggests that the
1. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592
(1982).
2. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
3. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 153 n.36 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by
an equally divided Court, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
4. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 737 (D. Md. 2018).
5. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 597–98.
6. Id. at 609.
7. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695,
1708 (2017) (“Unsurprisingly given the treatment of civil rights protestors,
religious minorities, and other dissenters in the Deep South, racism isn’t the only
‘ism’ linked to federalism and localism.”); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark
Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (2004) (discussing concern that “the story of statebased racial oppression reveals a fundamental truth about the dynamics of
federalism”).
8. See Gerken, supra note 7; Young, supra note 7.
9. See Young, supra note 7, at 1277.
10. A more recent example is the Supreme Court’s holding that Section 4 of
the Voting Rights Act, which provided a formula to determine which jurisdictions
had to preclear changes to their voting laws with the federal government, violated
the “equal sovereignty” of the states. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013); Seth Davis, Equal Sovereignty as a Right Against a Remedy, 76 LA. L.
REV. 83 (2015).
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story of states standing for discrimination is incomplete. Before Snapp,
some states sought to stand for equality in the lower courts.11 And since
Snapp, states have continued to secure their residents from discrimination
by suing in federal court.12 These cases are also part of the story of equality
law.
The second incomplete story is about standing law. In this story,
questions about standing are questions about Article III and the separation
of powers.13 Questions about state standing law also implicate federalism.14
Questions about state standing, in other words, are questions about
constitutional structure, not questions about individual rights. But this is not
the whole story.15 As Snapp and its progeny reveal, questions about state
standing may also be questions about individual rights and the values they
represent. The Snapp Court justified its recognition of a state’s “substantial
interest” in standing for equality by reference to the “evils” of discrimination
based upon ethnicity, not by discussing Article III, the separation of powers,
or federalism.16 This history, too, is a part of the story of state standing and
Snapp’s prominent place within it.
This Article reads Snapp as an equality law case in order to take stock
of state standing for equality.17 Its principal argument is that state standing
11. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 317 (3d Cir. 1981)
(collecting cases and explaining that “[c]ourts in this circuit have long recognized
that [a state] may bring a parens patriae action in the United States district courts
to enforce the fourteenth amendment”).
12. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Bull HN Inf. Sys., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97
(D. Mass. 1998) (“It seems indisputable that a state has a quasi-sovereign interest
in preventing racial discrimination of its citizens. . . . Similarly, courts have found
a quasi-sovereign interest in preventing discrimination against other protected or
disadvantaged groups . . . .”) (citing People v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 39
(2d Cir. 1982); People v. Peter & John’s Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 809, 812
(N.D.N.Y. 1996); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Waterford,
799 F. Supp. 272, 277 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)).
13. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–22 (2007).
15. Scholars are increasingly recognizing that more than the familiar
structural principles are at stake in government standing cases. See, e.g., Tara
Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851, 858 (2016); Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 589 (2015).
16. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
609 (1982).
17. This Article does not discuss a state’s standing to vindicate its “equal
sovereignty” under the Constitution. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013); Davis, supra note 10, at 83. In light of the recent proliferation of state
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for equality reflects a substantive vision of federalism in which states have
a substantial interest in protecting their residents from discriminatory
subordination.18 The law of state standing has embraced Snapp’s restatement
of judicially cognizable state interests, but the law of equality has moved away
from Snapp’s understanding of equality as antisubordination.19 This
divergence creates a challenge for the future of state standing for equality.

litigation in federal court, there is growing literature on state standing, much of it
focused on a state’s standing to litigate its sovereign interests. See, e.g., Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New Process
Federalism”, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1739 (2017); Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign
Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2017); Shannon M. Roesler,
State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State,
91 WASH. L. REV. 637 (2016); Grove, supra note 15, at 851; Davis, supra note 15,
at 585; Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 209 (2014); Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 72–83 (2014); Aziz Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA.
L. REV. 1435 (2013); Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 845 (2012); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State
Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051 (2011); Calvin Massey, State Standing After
Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249 (2009); Bradford Mank, Should States
Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s
New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008); Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387 (1995);
Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79 (1996). This
Article instead focuses on state lawsuits to vindicate equality norms that protect
individuals, such as the Equal Protection Clause.
18. See generally Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Angela OnwuachiWillig, Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of Race-Based
Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. REV. 272,
276 (2015) (contrasting antisubordination with anticlassification approach to
equal protection) (citing Bertrall L. Ross, II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust:
Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1565, 1597 (2013); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
9 (2004); Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004)).
19. For an example of the influence of Snapp’s restatement of judicially
cognizable state interests, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–22
(discussing proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign injuries to states). For an
example of the federal courts’ movement away from an antisubordination
understanding of equality law, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007) (“Before Brown [v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)], schoolchildren were told where they could and could not
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases
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A state’s judicially cognizable interest in standing for equality may
take any one of three forms. First, as in Snapp, a state may seek to protect
its residents from discrimination by standing for them as a parens patriae
representative.20 This sort of standing involves a state’s unique “quasisovereign” interests in the health and wellbeing of its populace.21 In
addition, states may stand for equality when they vindicate their own
rights,22 such as their proprietary rights as a property owner and a party to
contracts.23 A third way in which a state may stand for equality involves a
state’s powers to govern.24 A state may seek, for example, to ensure the
enforceability of its own equality law.25
Recently, a flurry of high profile lawsuits has underscored the
potential of each of these forms of state standing to protect individuals
from discrimination. In Hawaii v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit held that the State
of Hawaii had proprietary and sovereign standing to challenge the Trump
Administration’s second ban on travel from majority-Muslim countries.26 In
Pennsylvania v. Trump, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania claimed
standing as a provider of government services, including state-funded
contraceptive care for its female residents, to challenge the Trump
Administration’s promulgation of exceptions to the Affordable Care Act’s
contraceptive mandate.27 In Aziz v. Trump, another travel ban case, a federal
district court held that the Commonwealth of Virginia had parens patriae
standing to espouse the equal protection claims of its residents.28
These recent examples of state standing for equality raise practically
important and normatively difficult questions. States are increasingly
bringing public actions to redress alleged discrimination in controversial
cases of national scope. These cases implicate hard questions of
constitutional and statutory interpretation and have significant
have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once
again—even for very different reasons.”).
20. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608–10.
21. See id. at 607 (“[A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and
well-being . . . of its residents in general.”).
22. See infra notes 140–159 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234–37 (9th Cir. 2018).
24. See generally Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601 (explaining that state has interest in
“exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant
jurisdiction”).
25. Cf. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 763 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
26. See id. at 765.
27. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 566–67 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
28. Aziz v. Trump, 231 F. Supp. 3d 23, 32 (E.D. Va. 2017).
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consequences for the role of the federal courts, enforcement of law, and
federalism. Such questions include whether states are due “special solicitude
in [the] standing analysis,”29 particularly when they seek to stand for
equality, and whether they may sue under any circumstances to secure their
residents from federal discrimination.30 The answers to these questions will
help determine the future of state standing for equality. That future may look
very different from the vision laid out in Snapp, not only in the bases for
state standing, but also in the substantive vision of federalism and equality
law that supports it.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I offers a close reading of
Snapp as an equality law case. Part II focuses upon state standing for
equality today, showing that it has continued Snapp’s substantive vision
of federalism and equality law. Part III offers thoughts on the future of
state standing for equality.
I. SNAPP AND EQUALITY LAW
Snapp contains the Supreme Court’s most comprehensive modern
restatement of the law of state standing.31 The Court’s categorization of
judicially cognizable state interests remains the touchstone of the law of
state standing. As the Court explained in Snapp, a state may seek to litigate
in federal court based upon its proprietary, sovereign, or quasi-sovereign
interests.32 In Snapp itself, quasi-sovereign interests afforded Puerto Rico
standing to sue in a parens patriae capacity to protect its citizens from
discrimination.33 Thus, a state’s judicially cognizable interests included
“securing [its] residents from the harmful effects of discrimination.”34 This
interest was “peculiarly strong” for Puerto Rico, whose residents faced
discrimination based upon ethnicity, not simply upon their place of
residence.35
This Part describes Snapp’s substantive vision of a state’s interest in
protecting its residents from discriminatory subordination. It summarizes

29. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
30. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923). In Mellon,
the Court reasoned that “it is no part of [a state’s] duty or power to enforce [its
citizens’] rights in respect of their relations with the federal government.” Id.
31. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592 (1982).
32. See id. at 602.
33. See id. at 608.
34. Id. at 609.
35. Id.
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Snapp’s framework for state standing and then discusses Snapp as an
equality law case.
A. Snapp as a Standing Law Case
Private standing in federal courts has familiar constitutional and
prudential limits. To have Article III standing to sue, a plaintiff must point
to an injury in fact.36 This injury must be: (1) concrete, imminent, and
particularized; (2) caused by the defendant; and (3) redressable through
judicial relief.37 These standing requirements limit judicial authority and
aim to protect the separation of powers.38 Not all limits on standing are
constitutional ones, however. As a prudential matter, a litigant with an
Article III injury may lack access to the courthouse.39 For example,
litigants generally must sue to vindicate their own rights, not the rights of
absent third parties.40 To have third-party standing to sue, a litigant must
have a unique relationship with the rights-holder.41
States may have Article III standing based upon any of several
different types of interests. They may sue, much as a private corporation
would, to protect their proprietary interests.42 Or states may sue to
vindicate their sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests.43 In some cases,
standing doctrine has shown “special solicitude” to states,44 affording
them standing even when they cannot demonstrate the sort of concrete,
personal injury required of private parties or permitting them to sue in a
representative capacity without satisfying the prudential requirements for
third-party standing.45 This Section illustrates the basic framework for
judicially cognizable state interests and summarizes Snapp’s discussion of
a state’s interest in securing its residents from discrimination.

36. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2013).
38. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
39. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (distinguishing constitutional from
prudential standing).
40. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114–16 (1976).
41. See id.
42. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 601 (1982).
43. See id. at 602.
44. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
45. See Davis, supra note 15, at 595–97.
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1. Judicially Cognizable State Interests
Snapp distinguishes three types of judicially cognizable state interests:
proprietary interests, sovereign interests, and quasi-sovereign interests.
a. Proprietary Interests
As Snapp discussed, “like other associations and private parties, a
State is bound to have a variety of proprietary interests. . . . And like other
such proprietors it may at times need to pursue those interests in court.”46
States may own real property, enter into contracts, and so on. These
proprietary or “corporate” interests support standing under Article III on
the same terms that apply to private parties.47 Thus, a state may claim
standing in a “private” capacity. Like a private litigant with interests as an
owner or as a party to a contract, a state may suffer a judicially cognizable
injury to those interests that suffices to afford it standing in federal court.48
b. Sovereign Interests
A state may also sue in a uniquely public capacity as a sovereign
government. It may have standing to vindicate its authority to make and
enforce laws.49 In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court held that a state
could not invoke sovereign standing to challenge a federal statute under
the Tenth Amendment.50 The Mellon bar on state standing to vindicate
sovereign interests is not absolute, as earlier and subsequent case law
shows. In Missouri v. Holland, for example, the Court held that a state
could sue under the Tenth Amendment to enjoin implementation of a
federal statute on the ground that it regulated a matter reserved to state

46. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601–02.
47. See Davis, supra note 17, at 17–18. In one of its earliest cases, Georgia
v. Brailsford, the Supreme Court confirmed that a state may sue in federal court
to vindicate its proprietary interests. See Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
402, 405–09 (1792) (permitting state to sue to vindicate its common law
proprietary rights); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 17, at 406–07 (discussing
Brailsford). Today, it is well established that a state’s proprietary interests are
judicially cognizable. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
48. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
49. See id.
50. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484–85 (1923). The Court
held that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could not sue the federal
government as a parens patriae representative of its citizens. See id. at 485–86.
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regulation.51 And more recently the Court has permitted states to sue the
federal government to enforce sovereign interests, such as those arising
from the Tenth Amendment ban on commandeering.52 A state may also
have standing to “demand recognition from other sovereigns,”53 as in cases
involving interstate border disputes or claims of intergovernmental
immunity.54
c. Quasi-Sovereign Interests
The Snapp Court focused on a third category of justiciable state
interests, one that “does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition”: a
state’s “quasi-sovereign” interests.55 Quasi-sovereign interests support
state parens patriae actions in federal court. A state suing in a parens
patriae capacity seeks to protect the “well-being of its populace.”56
There is no “definitive list” of the quasi-sovereign interests that may
support a parens patriae suit, the Snapp Court explained, but rather a set
of guidelines for case-by-case determinations.57 A state’s quasi-sovereign
interests include protecting the general welfare of its residents and
securing for them the benefits of the federal system, such as the free flow
of interstate commerce.58 States may, for example, sue to enjoin public
nuisances.59 They may also sue to protect the “economic well-being” of
their residents under the federal antitrust laws.60 A state must allege,
however, “more . . . than injury to an identifiable group of individual
residents” to assert quasi-sovereign standing as a parens patriae
representative.61

51. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920); Davis, supra note 17,
at 19, 81 & n.438 (explaining that Missouri v. Holland is best understood as a case
involving a state’s sovereign interest in its institutional authority to govern).
52. See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018) (reaching
merits of anti-commandeering challenge to federal statute); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (same).
53. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
54. Id.; Davis, supra note 17, at 18 (discussing intergovernmental immunity
cases).
55. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
56. Id. at 602.
57. Id. at 607.
58. See id. at 602.
59. See id. at 603 (citing cases).
60. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
61. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
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2. A State’s Interest in Combatting Discrimination
In Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, the Court held that Pennsylvania could
not invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court on behalf of
Pennsylvania’s residents to challenge a New Jersey tax.62 Pennsylvania
argued that New Jersey had unlawfully discriminated against its residents
in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 In rejecting
Pennsylvania’s claim of standing to sue New Jersey for alleged equal
protection violations, the Court in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey looked to
the text of the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.64 According to the Court, Pennsylvania could not sue in its own
right because “both Clauses protect people, not States.”65 As a matter of
constitutional interpretation, therefore, Pennsylvania had no independent
interest in suing New Jersey for unlawful discrimination.66 Instead, it was
“merely litigating as a volunteer [for] the personal claims of its citizens.”67
The Court, therefore, held that Pennsylvania could not invoke the Court’s
original jurisdiction for that purpose.68 To grant the state standing in an
original action would be too disruptive of the constitutional scheme of
limited federal jurisdiction.69
As the Snapp Court read it, Pennsylvania v. New Jersey implied a limit
on state parens patriae standing in all federal courts, not just in the
Supreme Court. A state must assert a “quasi-sovereign” interest to stand
in parens patriae to protect its residents from discrimination.70 The Snapp

62. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 661–62, 664–66 (1976).
63. Id. at 661–62.
64. Id. at 665.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 666.
67. Id. at 665.
68. Id. at 665–66.
69. Id. (“For if, by the simple expedient of bringing an action in the name of
the State, this Court’s original jurisdiction could be invoked to resolve what are,
after all, suits to redress private grievances, our docket would be inundated. And,
more important, the critical distinction, articulated in Art. III, s. 2, of the
Constitution, between suits brought by ‘Citizens’ and those brought by ‘States’
would evaporate.”).
70. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
600 (1982) (“[I]f the State is only a nominal party without a real interest of its
own[,] then it will not have standing under the parens patriae doctrine.” (citing
Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 660)).
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Court explained that a “State has a substantial interest” in suing to protect
its “residents from the harmful effects of discrimination.”71
Snapp involved a claim of unlawful discrimination. The Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico sued Virginia apple growers, alleging that they had violated
two federal laws by discriminating against Puerto Rican workers in favor of
non-U.S. citizens and by stigmatizing Puerto Rican citizens as “inferior”
workers.72 In particular, Puerto Rico’s complaint alleged violations of the
Wagner–Peyser Act of 1933, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
federal foreign labor certification regulations.73 In a nutshell, the complaint
alleged that the apple growers violated federal law by failing to treat Puerto
Ricans as part of the domestic U.S. workforce when deciding to hire migrant
farmworkers from Jamaica to harvest an apple crop.74 Doing so, Puerto Rico
argued, violated federal law preferences for hiring domestic over foreign
workers under the interstate clearance system, which was designed to
alleviate problems of high unemployment during the Great Depression.75 At
the time, Puerto Rico was facing severe problems of unemployment across
the Commonwealth.76 Hundreds of Puerto Rican workers had been placed
with the defendant apple growers who subsequently refused to employ those
workers, in some cases firing them before the expiration of their
employment contracts and instead employing non-U.S. citizens.77
According to the Commonwealth’s complaint, the Virginia apple growers
thus discriminated against Puerto Rican workers by failing to afford them
the hiring preferences due to U.S. citizens.78
The Court held that Puerto Rico had quasi-sovereign standing to
litigate these claims.79 It recognized two quasi-sovereign bases for
standing. First, the Court held that a state’s interest in protecting its
“residents from the harmful effects of discrimination” was justiciable.80
Just as a state has a justiciable interest in “the health and well-being of its
71. Id. at 609.
72. Id. at 597–98, 609.
73. Id. at 598.
74. See Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. 632 F.2d
365, 367–68 (1st Cir. 1980), aff’d by Snapp, 458 U.S. 592.
75. See Snapp, 632 F.2d at 367.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 368.
78. Id. at 370.
79. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 (“This Court has had too much experience
with the political, social, and moral damage of discrimination not to recognize
that a State has a substantial interest in assuring its residents that it will act to
protect them from these evils.”).
80. Id.
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residents,” it also has a justiciable interest in protecting them from
discrimination.81 The Court stated that it “had too much experience with
the political, social, and moral damage of discrimination not to recognize
that a State has a substantial interest in assuring its residents that it will act
to protect them from these evils.”82
Second, the Court held that Puerto Rico had a specific interest in
protecting its citizens from the hiring preference violations at issue in the
case. The problem of unemployment was “surely a legitimate object of the
Commonwealth’s concern.”83 Federal statutes and regulations specifically
addressed that problem, and the “fact that the Commonwealth participates
directly in the operation of the federal employment scheme” gave it an
especially “compelling . . . parens patriae interest in assuring that the
scheme operates to the full benefit of its residents.”84
The Snapp Court held that Puerto Rico had standing to represent its
citizens in federal court based upon the unique rules that apply to state
parens patriae standing, rather than, for example, the typical third-party
standing rules that apply to private parties.85 The Court did not state that it
was affording Puerto Rico special solicitude in the standing analysis.86 But
its opinion, which relies on state standing precedents throughout, suggests
the possibility. In his concurring opinion, Justice William Brennan spelled
that possibility out: “a State is no ordinary litigant.”87
Justice John Paul Stevens, who joined Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion in Snapp, made good on that notion in his opinion for the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA.88 In that case, Massachusetts sued the
Environmental Protection Agency for failing to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions.89 Massachusetts pointed to several interests to support its
standing, including the state’s proprietary interest as an owner of its
coastline, which was receding as sea levels rose; its regulatory interest in
addressing climate change through state law, which the Clean Air Act
preempted; and its interests in protecting its citizens’ health and well-

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 610.
85. Id.
86. The Court adverted briefly to the “standing requirements of Art. III,”
explaining that “[a] quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to
create an actual controversy between the State and the defendant.” Id. at 602.
87. Id. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring).
88. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
89. Id. at 505.
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being.90 The state’s standing depended upon its proprietary injury as an
owner of coastline property.91 To that proprietary interest, the Court added
the state’s “sovereign” interest in the “exercise of its police powers”92 and
its “quasi-sovereign” interest in the “health and welfare of its citizens.”93
Lumping these distinct interests together, the Court concluded
Massachusetts was “entitled to special solicitude” and had standing.94
Although Snapp may not, by itself, establish Massachusetts v. EPA’s
premise that states are due special solicitude as litigants in federal court, it
does establish that they may seek to combat discrimination against their
residents by suing in federal court. In Snapp’s vision of federalism, this
state interest is a “substantial” one rooted in recognition of the values that
underlie equality law.95 It is to those values, and Snapp’s vision of them,
that this Article now turns.
B. Snapp as an Equality Law Case
Snapp’s discussion of a state’s substantial interest in combatting
discrimination reflects a substantive understanding of federalism and
equality, one that may be better understood by reading Snapp as an
equality law case. Read in such a manner, Snapp has something significant
to say about core questions in equality law, including equality as
antisubordination, equality and poverty, affirmative action, and equality
and public administration.
Perhaps the most significant and interesting aspect of Snapp is its
substantive vision of a state’s interest in advancing equality by combatting
subordination. According to the Court, a state has a “substantial interest”
in addressing “‘[d]eliberate efforts to stigmatize the labor force as
inferior.’”96 This sort of concern with the subordinating effects of
90. See id. at 519.
91. See id. at 522 (“Because the Commonwealth ‘owns a substantial portion
of the state’s coastal property,’ . . . it has alleged a particularized injury in its
capacity as a landowner.” (internal citations omitted)).
92. See id. at 518–19.
93. See id. at 519 (lumping sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests together
by referring both to a state’s “sovereign prerogatives” to “exercise its police
powers” and to a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in “the health and welfare of its
citizens,” which gives a “State standing to sue parens patriae” (quoting Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
94. Id. at 520.
95. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609.
96. See id. (quoting Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons,
Inc., 632 F.2d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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discrimination sounds in an antisubordination understanding of equality.97
Scholars have distinguished an antisubordination understanding of
equality from an anticlassification understanding. The anticlassification
understanding is focused upon individuals and individualized harm from
discrimination.98 On this understanding, a commitment to equal treatment
is a commitment to protect individuals against discriminatory
classifications. When it comes to challenges to racial discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause, for example, an anticlassification
understanding focuses upon “protect[ing] individuals against all forms of
racial classification.”99 While discussions of the anticlassification
understanding of equality are often focused upon constitutional constraints
upon government action, they are also relevant to understanding civil
rights and employment law more generally, including in cases that involve
constraints on private action.100 Anticlassification offers an
“individualized orientation” to equality law as opposed to one that focuses
upon group harms and subordination.101
The anticlassification understanding of equality law is associated with
judicial suspicion of affirmative governmental measures to redress group
domination and subordination. Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring
opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins nicely sums up this understanding as
applied to the Equal Protection Clause: “At the heart of this interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must
treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or
religious groups. It is for this reason that we must subject all racial
classifications to the strictest of scrutiny . . . .”102 On that understanding of
equal protection, Justice Thomas joined the majority in Jenkins to hold
that a district court may not order a state to remedy school segregation by
97. Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86
VA. L. REV. 397, 454 (2000) (discussing antisubordination understanding of
equality law and explaining that “[p]ersistent group-based inequality feeds a
stigma that . . . imposes psychic harm on members of stigmatized groups”).
98. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 18, at 1472 (describing anticlassification
understanding as “a particular conception of equality, one that is committed to
individuals rather than to groups”).
99. Id. at 1473; Balkin & Siegel, supra note 18, at 10 (explaining that
anticlassification “principle holds that government may not classify people either
overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category”).
100. See Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 455–56 (describing an “orthodox
account of civil rights law [that] . . . . treats civil rights law as aiming at eliminating
individualized irrationality and ensuring that all candidates for positions are
treated on the basis of individual merit”).
101. Id. at 456.
102. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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taking affirmative steps to attract nonminority students from one school
district to enroll in schools in a different, majority-minority school
district.103 And on that same understanding, the Supreme Court has
rejected voluntary efforts by state actors to integrate schools; in a plurality
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, for instance, Chief Justice John Roberts invoked an
anticlassification understanding of equal protection when he concluded
that school boards may not consider race when trying to address de facto
school segregation, opining that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”104
It is not clear that the anticlassification understanding of
antidiscrimination can sustain the sort of state standing that Snapp
recognized. In recognizing state standing for equality, Snapp focused upon
harms to Puerto Ricans as a group, not individualized harms suffered by
each Puerto Rican worker who was denied employment. The logic of state
standing rules demanded as much. A state, after all, lacks parens patriae
standing to represent individuals as such; the state must point to something
“more . . . than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents.”105
As the Fourth Circuit explained, in determining whether a state has parens
patriae standing, “[i]t is the magnitude and pervasiveness of the societal
harm that must be weighed—not the directness of the injury to particular
individuals.”106 For a state to have such standing, a “substantial portion of
the citizens” must be affected.107 And a substantial portion—perhaps all—
of Puerto Rico was affected by the apple growers’ discriminatory actions:
As the Fourth Circuit put it, and as the Supreme Court agreed, “[d]eliberate
efforts to stigmatize the labor force as inferior carry a universal sting.”108
103. See id. at 101–02.
104. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007) (plurality op.). But cf. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120
YALE L.J. 1278, 1303–08 (2011) (distinguishing anticlassification understanding
of Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion from “antibalkinization”
understanding of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which was
concerned with the potential of both “racial stratification and its repair . . . to
balkanize”).
105. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
607 (1982).
106. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365,
370 (4th Cir. 1980).
107. Id.
108. Id.; see Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 (quoting and agreeing with Fourth
Circuit’s analysis of Puerto Rico’s interest in combatting efforts to stigmatize
Puerto Rican workers).

162

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

The effect, according to the Fourth Circuit, “certainly . . . permeates the
entire island of Puerto Rico.”109
It was not, in other words, the classification of individuals that was the
basis of Puerto Rico’s standing for equality. To the contrary, it was Puerto
Rico’s interest in combatting the stigmatization of Puerto Ricans as a group.
If Puerto Rico’s interest had been to combat the individualized harm of
arbitrary classification, then its standing should have turned upon the
aggregate impacts of individualized employment discrimination. The apple
growers argued that there were not enough individual acts of employment
discrimination to afford Puerto Rico a judicially cognizable interest, on the
theory that the limited number of instances of discrimination did not have a
substantial effect on Puerto Rico’s economy.110 The Supreme Court, however,
concluded that aggregating the economic impacts of individualized
employment discrimination was “too narrow a view of the interests at
stake.”111 Puerto Rico’s judicially cognizable interest encompassed the
“political, social, and moral damage of discrimination,” harms that Puerto
Ricans suffered as a group.112 Those group harms supported Puerto Rico’s
standing to sue to protect Puerto Ricans from the “evils” of discrimination.113
This account of a state’s substantive interest in combatting discrimination
sounds not in an anticlassification understanding of equality, but instead in an
antisubordination understanding. Unlike the anticlassification understanding,
the antisubordination understanding of the harms of discrimination focuses
upon “group-based subordination.”114 When it comes to challenging
government action under the Equal Protection Clause, the antisubordination
understanding focuses upon “practices that enforce the inferior social status
of historically oppressed groups.”115 More generally, the antisubordination
109. Snapp, 632 F.2d at 370 (“The apparent inability of the United States
government, through the Department of Labor, to grant Puerto Ricans equal
treatment with other citizens or even with foreign temporary workers must
certainly have an effect which permeates the entire island of Puerto Rico.”).
110. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 453. But see Sergio J. Campos,
Subordination and the Fortuity of Our Circumstances, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
585, 585 (2008) (offering account of antisubordination understanding “that
focuses on one’s position in society [and] rejecting the focus on groups popular
in the existing antisubordination literature”).
115. Siegel, supra note 18, at 1472–73; see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (arguing that Equal
Protection Clause prohibits state action that “aggravates (or perpetuates?) the
subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group”).
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understanding of civil rights law focuses upon addressing pervasive social
practices and structures that maintain the subordination of particular disfavored
or disadvantaged groups.116 Discrimination, understood thus, entails treating
groups as second-class citizens or subordinate castes.117 Such persistent secondclass treatment, to name but one type of harm, “feeds a stigma that . . . imposes
psychic harm on members of stigmatized groups . . . .”118 The aim of equality
law is to reform social practices and structures that perpetuate this and other
similar group-based harms from discrimination.119
On an antisubordination understanding of equality law, a state has a
compelling interest in taking affirmative steps to eliminate group-based
subordination.120 In Parents Involved, for example, the dissenting Justices
116. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 453–55.
117. See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in
Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 955–57 (2012)
(contrasting antisubordination and anticlassification understandings of
employment discrimination law and explaining that “the antisubordination
principle allows classification (or consideration of, for example, race or sex) to
the extent the classification is intended to challenge group subordination”); Balkin
& Siegel, supra note 18, at 9 (“Antisubordination theorists contend that
guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive
social stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and practices
that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups.”);
Christopher A. Bracey, Adjudication, Antisubordination, and the Jazz
Connection, 54 ALA. L. REV. 853, 860 (2003) (explaining that on an
antisubordination understanding, “a law is objectionable on equality grounds if it
has the effect of creating or reinforcing second-class citizenship on the basis of
race, ethnicity, gender, or similar category”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2429 (1994) (arguing that anticaste principle
of equality law poses question whether “‘law or practice in question contribute[s]
to the maintenance of second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status, for blacks
or women’”).
118. Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 454.
119. See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing aim of
antisubordination understanding of equality law to “reform institutions and
practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed
groups”).
120. At the risk of oversimplification, while “the anticlassification principle
indicts affirmative action and allows facially neutral policies with a racially
disparate impact, . . . the antisubordination principle indicts facially neutral
practices with a racially disparate impact and legitimates affirmative action.”
Areheart, supra note 117, at 961. The risk of oversimplification arises from the
historical relationship between the antisubordination and anticlassification
rationales: “courts have deployed the presumption against racial classification to
express, to disguise, and to limit constitutional concerns about practices that
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advanced an antisubordination understanding of equal protection to conclude
that a school board may adopt a race-conscious desegregation plan to address
de facto school segregation.121 As Justice Stevens put it, “a decision to
exclude a member of a minority because of his race is fundamentally
different from a decision to include a member of a minority for that
reason.”122 Thus, the antisubordination understanding supports a state that
claims an interest in combatting persistent practices and social conditions
that subordinate or stigmatize disfavored groups.123
That is precisely the interest that Snapp recognized as supporting state
standing for equality. The Supreme Court concurred with the Fourth Circuit
that “‘[d]eliberate efforts to stigmatize the [Puerto Rican] labor force as
inferior carry a universal sting,’” one that struck Puerto Ricans as a group
and one that Puerto Rico’s government had standing to seek to redress.124
Puerto Rico’s interest in combatting stigmatization was “peculiarly strong”
because its suit challenged “invidious discrimination . . . along ethnic
lines.”125 In this way, Justice Brennan suggested in his concurring opinion,
Puerto Rico’s standing “compared favorably with” the standing of private
organizations to challenge discriminatory practices that perpetuate racial
and ethnic subordination.126
enforce group inequality.” Siegel, supra note 18, at 1547. Thus, the “application
of the anticlassification principle [has] shift[ed] over time” in ways that
incorporate “antisubordination values” into equality law. Balkin & Siegel, supra
note 18, at 13–14.
121. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 799 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Siegel, supra note 104, at 1305 (explaining that dissenting Justices in Parents
Involved adopted antisubordination understanding of equal protection).
122. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 799 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice
Harry Blackmun once put it, “in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause
perpetuate racial supremacy.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 838–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
609 (1982) (quoting Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc.,
632 F.2d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 1980)).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 611–12 (Brennan, J., concurring) (comparing Puerto Rico’s
standing to standing of organizations in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982) (holding that fair housing organization had standing to
challenge “steering practices [that had] perceptibly impaired [the organization’s]
ability to provide counseling and referral services for low-and moderate-income
homeseekers”), Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
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The Snapp Court’s recognition of a relationship between poverty and
discriminatory subordination also underscores its substantive vision of a
state’s interest in combatting discrimination. From the perspective of an
antisubordination theorist, “policies promoting economic growth are an
important part of equality law insofar as growth is associated with
employment and the reduction of poverty.”127 According to the Snapp
Court, not only did Puerto Rico have an interest in redressing the
stigmatization of its labor force, it also had an interest in solving the
problem of “[u]nemployment among Puerto Rican residents.”128 The
Fourth Circuit elaborated on those intertwined interests, explaining that
“[t]he island’s officials are coping with an almost unmanageable
unemployment problem. . . . The morale of the average Puerto Rican
citizen under the circumstances can be expected to be extremely low.” 129
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded, the apple growers’ deliberate
stigmatization of the Puerto Rican work force “carr[ied] a universal
sting.”130 Thus, Puerto Rico’s interest in combatting inequality and
reducing poverty were intertwined.131
Affirmative litigation by Puerto Rico’s government was appropriate
to achieve those goals in light of the barriers to litigation by Puerto Rican
migrant workers. The federal employment service scheme under which
Puerto Rico sued operated for the benefit of Puerto Rican workers and, in
theory, they might have claimed standing to sue in their own right. In
practice, however, “[m]igrant farm workers are so destitute that . . . . [i]t
cannot be said with any assurance that they are in positions to litigate the

252, 263 (1977) (holding that nonprofit corporation had standing to sue based
upon its “interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in areas where
such housing is scarce”), and NAACP v. Burton, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963)
(holding that NAACP could sue to challenge state law that effectively limited the
its ability to advocate for racial equality)).
127. Sunstein, supra note 117, at 2451.
128. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609.
129. Snapp, 632 F.2d at 370.
130. Id.; see Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 (concurring with Fourth Circuit’s holding
that Puerto Rico had judicially cognizable interest in combatting discriminatory
stigmatization).
131. Thus, Snapp does not depend solely upon a conceptualization of
discrimination’s harms in terms of psychological stigmatization; it also points
towards the material harms of racism and ethnic prejudice. See generally Ian F.
Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1058–59 (2007) (critiquing account of
harms of racism that emphasizes “psychological damage” without accounting for
“racism’s material manifestations”).
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issues effectively.”132 Nor, it appeared, was the Department of Labor in a
position to effectively enforce the employment scheme on behalf of Puerto
Rican workers, which underscored the problem of discriminatory
subordination and supported Puerto Rico’s claim of standing to sue.133
Puerto Rico’s standing to combat discriminatory subordination found
further support from the connection between equality and public
administration. As a government, Puerto Rico “participate[d] directly in
the operation of the federal employment scheme”; this participation as a
public administrator made “even more compelling its parens patriae
interest in assuring that the scheme operates to the full benefit of its
residents.”134 In particular, Puerto Rico’s own Department of Labor had a
duty under Puerto Rican law to improve working conditions and to address
problems of widespread unemployment.135 Puerto Rico’s suit was “in
furtherance” of that department’s responsibilities as a public
administrator.136 In the decades since Snapp was decided, it has become
apparent that administrative agencies play a crucial role in advancing
equality law, both by enforcing antidiscrimination norms137 and by
132. Snapp, 632 F.2d at 370.
133. See id. (“The apparent inability of the United States government, through
the Department of Labor, to grant Puerto Ricans equal treatment with other
citizens or even with foreign temporary workers must certainly have an effect
which permeates the entire island of Puerto Rico.”); cf. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610
n.16 (noting that “the Secretary of Labor has represented that he has no objection
to Puerto Rico’s standing as parens patriae under these circumstances”).
Puerto Rico’s claim on the merits presents difficult normative questions
about employment preferences and affirmative action. After all, Puerto Rico
sought to challenge the defendants’ decision to hire Jamaican migrant workers
over Puerto Rican migrant workers. See Snapp, 632 F.2d at 367. Puerto Rico’s
suit thus presented complex questions about the intersections among employment
preferences for domestic workers and race and ethnicity in a globalized economy.
134. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610.
135. Snapp, 632 F.2d at 369.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 DUKE
L.J. 1807, 1813 (2017) (discussing and defending role of federal agencies in
“interpret[ing] statutes in a way that provides historically marginalized groups
with protections that the Supreme Court has denied them”); Karen M. Tani,
Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 831 (2015) (explaining that “as
early as 1936, federal welfare administrators applied the Equal Protection Clause
to their work”); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1897, 1898 (2013) (discussing rulemaking by Department of Housing and
Urban Development that “could be seen as part of an effort to pursue the
constitutional goal of equal protection” and surveying issues raised by
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adopting “innovative inclusionary regulations” that do not depend upon
antidiscrimination law and aim to advance “social inclusion.”138 Puerto
Rico’s attempt to put Depression era unemployment legislation to work in
combatting discriminatory subordination through public administration
and litigation was an innovative response to a problem that Puerto Rico
could not address through its laws alone.139
In short, Snapp’s substantive vision of state standing for equality
reflects an antisubordination understanding of antidiscrimination, one in
which a state has a substantial interest in affirmative litigation designed to
combat social practices and structures, including structures of poverty, that
perpetuate discriminatory subordination, particularly where the state
participates in a federal scheme that seeks to address these sorts of
problems. Thus, there are multiple threads to Snapp’s standing analysis.
Subsequent state litigation has picked up on these threads, advancing the
substantive vision of state standing to combat subordination while
revealing that state standing for equality is not limited to parens patriae
representation based upon quasi-sovereign interests.
II. STATE STANDING FOR EQUALITY TODAY
Snapp’s substantive vision of federalism and equality law is reflected
in state standing for equality today. But the scope of state standing for
equality is much broader than Snapp itself might suggest. Of course, states
may seek, as in Snapp, to stand upon their quasi-sovereign interests in
protecting their residents from discrimination. They may also, however,
stand for equality on the same terms as a private party might, invoking the
same doctrines that permit private litigants to sue in federal court. States
may, for instance, stand for equality when they vindicate their own
“administrative constitutionalism”); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA.
L. REV. 799, 807 (2010) (exploring how administrative agencies “actually go
about interpreting and implementing the Constitution” and its guarantee of equal
protection).
138. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn; Innovation and Diffusion in
Civil Rights Law, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 134 (2016); see also Olatunde
C.A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66 DUKE L.J.
1771, 1775 (2017) (discussing emergence of “novel forms of regulation by civil
rights agencies”).
139. Cf. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609–10 (concluding that Puerto Rico’s standing
was supported by its participation in federal scheme designed to address a
problem that in theory Puerto Rico might have tried to “address . . . through its
own legislation”).
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“private” rights or when they invoke third party standing to represent
another’s rights. In addition, states may stand for equality when they seek
to vindicate their powers to govern, including their powers to make law
and to administer regulatory programs. States may, in other words, invoke
not only their quasi-sovereign interests as in Snapp, but also their
proprietary or sovereign interests to stand for equality in federal court.
This Part explores recent examples of state standing for equality,
beginning with cases in which states have claimed standing on the same
terms as a private litigant might, then discussing cases involving sovereign
standing to enforce equality law, and concluding with cases in which states
have relied upon Snapp’s discussion of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest
in combatting discrimination. What links these cases together is their
commitment to a vision of federalism in which states have substantial
interests in suing to address practices or policies that would subject their
residents to discriminatory subordination.
A. State Standing for Equality on the Same Terms as Private Standing
State standing for equality need not depend upon special solicitude for
states in the standing analysis. In some cases, states may point to the same
sorts of injuries that a private party might advert to in order to establish
constitutional standing to vindicate their own rights, including their own
rights as sovereigns. And states may also seek to vindicate the rights of
third parties by pointing to the same prudential rules that apply to thirdparty standing in private litigation.
1. First-Party Standing
In some cases, states—or their subdivisions—may stand for equality
on the same terms as a private party. They may, for example, point to
proprietary injuries as the basis for constitutional standing while seeking
to vindicate their own rights under federal law.
Recent sanctuary city litigation provides a ready example. In County
of Santa Clara v. Trump,140 local governments sued in the federal Northern
District of California for a preliminary injunction against an executive
order issued by President Trump that threatened to eliminate funding from
sanctuary jurisdictions. This order, which reflected President Trump’s
campaign promise to deport millions of undocumented immigrants,141
directed federal agencies to “[e]nsure” that sanctuary jurisdictions would
140. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
141. See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70
VAND. L. REV. 777, 783 (2017).
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not “receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law.”142 Santa Clara
County, the lead plaintiff, received approximately 35% of its total annual
revenue from federal funding.143 The district court held that the local
government plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact from the Administration’s
threat to cut off federal funding,144 which would result in budget
uncertainty and the anticipated loss of millions of dollars.145 The district
court concluded that the local governments’ various constitutional
challenges were likely to succeed and granted a nationwide preliminary
injunction to protect them from the Trump Administration’s attempt “to
coerce them into changing their [law enforcement] policies in violation of
the Tenth Amendment.”146
In City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit made
short work of the Trump Administration’s argument that San Francisco,
as well as Santa Clara County, lacked standing to challenge the President’s
executive order on sanctuary jurisdictions.147 Standing straightforwardly
followed from the fundamental principle that “[a] ‘loss of funds promised
under federal law[] satisfies Article III’s standing requirement.’”148
Because both counties had “policies in place that arguably would qualify
for grant withdrawal under the Executive Order, with potentially
devastating consequences,” they had standing to challenge that order.149
The California Attorney General brought a similar suit on behalf of
the State of California, which also stood to lose federal funding under the
Trump Administration’s policy against sanctuary jurisdictions.150 This suit
likewise relied on the financial threat to the state’s fiscal budget for
standing purposes.151

142. Exec. Order 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
143. Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 511–12.
144. See id. at 528–30.
145. See id. at 529 (holding that plaintiffs “have demonstrated that the Order
threatens to withhold federal grant money and that the threat of the Order is
presently causing [them] injury in the form of significant budget uncertainty”).
146. Id. at 536–37.
147. See San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2018).
148. Id. at 1235 (quoting Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795
F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2015)).
149. Id. at 1236.
150. See California v. Sessions, No. 17-cv-04701-WHO, at *1–2, *15–16
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018) (denying preliminary injunction on the merits but
concluding that financial injuries sufficed for Article III).
151. See id. at 15–16.
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A financial injury, such as a loss of federal funds, would give a private
party standing to sue under Article III.152 In these cases, states and their
subdivisions have standing on the same terms as a private party might.
Such a financial injury may give a state or its subdivision standing to raise
its own rights as a sovereign government. Santa Clara, for example, sought
to vindicate its own rights under the Tenth Amendment.153
Although these cases do not seek to advance equal protection norms
directly, they do seek to advance the goal of combatting discriminatory
subordination. Santa Clara County, for example, had adopted a policy
prohibiting its employees “from ‘initiat[ing] any inquiry or enforcement
action based solely on the individual’s actual or suspected immigration
status, national origin, race, ethnicity, and/or inability to speak
English.’”154 Its challenge to the Trump Administration’s sanctuary city
policy indirectly advanced that antidiscrimination norm.
More generally, by vindicating its Tenth Amendment rights, Santa
Clara stood for equality insofar as the Trump Administration’s sanctuary
city and immigration policies would naturally, if not inevitably, lead to
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. As Kevin
Johnson has argued, “local criminal arrests and prosecutions influenced by
police reliance on race inexorably contribute to the racially disparate
removal rates experienced in the modern United States.”155 Entanglement
of local police with federal immigration enforcement “has raised
numerous concerns, including racial profiling and the threat of individual
rights violations.”156
Sanctuary jurisdiction policies reflect state and local goals of
combatting the stigmatization of immigrants and people of color and
advancing diversity and inclusivity. Such policies “reflect[] a respect for
152. See San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1234–35; Seth Davis, The New Public
Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2018).
153. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 508 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
154. See San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1236.
155. Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The
Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
993, 1001 (2016).
156. Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption
Analysis of Sub-Federal Immigration Laws: The California Trust Act, 18 CHAP.
L. REV. 481, 482 (2015); see also Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch,
Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 SANTA
CLARA L. Rev. 539, 568 (2017) (“Another significant goal of some delineation
critiques [of the conflation of immigration policy with crime control]—
particularly those focusing on the deeper, race-based logic of the ‘criminal alien’
paradigm—is to restore equal treatment for immigrants or Latinos.”).
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and appreciation of diverse communities,” and recognize that immigration
enforcement can have ramifying effects to perpetuate subordination
“across workplaces, homes, schools, and neighborhoods.”157 President
Trump announced his candidacy with a speech that stigmatized Mexican
immigrants as rapists and drugdealers.158 Since the inauguration, the
President has doubled down on that stigmatizing rhetoric.159 Against this
backdrop, state and local litigation challenging the Administration’s
threats to withdraw funding from sanctuary cities should be seen as
examples of state standing for equality in the vein of Snapp. Though these
cases show that states need not point to quasi-sovereign interests to stand
for equality, they share with Snapp a substantive vision of federalism and
equality in which states have judicially cognizable interests that permit
them to combat racial and ethnic subordination.
2. Third-Party Standing
In the sanctuary city litigation, states and local governments have
raised their own rights to challenge federal action on the merits. A state’s
standing to vindicate equality need not, however, depend upon the state’s
own rights. Instead, a state may seek third-party standing to litigate an
equal protection claim.
A private party with Article III standing may have third-party standing
to raise the rights of another party in litigation.160 Third-party standing
depends on the relationship between the litigant and the third party whose
rights are at stake and on the third party’s ability to assert her own rights.161
To establish third-party standing, a private litigant must show that the third
party’s interests are “inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant
wishes to pursue”; that she is “fully, or very nearly, as effective a
157. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C.
L. REV. 1703, 1769 (2018).
158. See id. at 1715 & n.45 (quoting Donald Trump Transcript: “Our Country
Needs a Truly Great Leader”, WALL STREET J. (June 16, 2015, 2:29 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/16/donald-trump-transcript-our-countryneeds-a-truly-great-leader [https://perma.cc/WK96-9X6P]).
159. See id. at 1716 & n.54 (“In July 2017, President Trump told community
members in Suffolk County, New York that undocumented immigrants who
commit crimes of violence are ‘animals’ that render cities ‘bloodstained killing
fields . . . .’”) (quoting Maggie Haberman & Liz Robbins, Trump, on Long Island,
Vows an End to Gang Violence, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), http://www.nytimes
.com/2017/07/28/us/politics/trump-immigrationgangviolence-long-island.html
[https://perma.cc/R2WT-RLTU]).
160. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193–95 (1976).
161. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114–16 (1976).
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proponent of the right” as the third party; or, finally, that there is a
“genuine obstacle” to the third party’s assertion of her rights in court.162
In Washington v. Trump, for example, Washington and Minnesota
challenged the Trump Administration’s ban on travel from Iraq, Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—all majority-Muslim
countries.163 The Ninth Circuit held that the states had Article III standing
to sue the Administration to redress a proprietary injury to their public
universities arising from the President’s travel ban.164 Because of the ban,
nationals of the seven affected countries could not travel to the United
States to teach, research, or study at Washington’s or Minnesota’s public
universities.165 As a result, the states suffered financial injuries to their
“proprietary interests as operators of their public universities.”166 The
University of Washington, for example, stood to lose its investment on
visa applications and other costs for foreign nationals denied entry under
the ban.167 Although the plaintiff states raised other interests, including
their quasi-sovereign interests in protecting their citizens, the Ninth Circuit
held that their proprietary interests sufficed to establish Article III
standing.168
Although the court in Washington v. Trump allowed the states thirdparty standing to assert the rights of students and scholars, including their
equal protection rights,169 it did not afford “special solicitude” to the
states.170 Special solicitude was not necessary because, as the Ninth Circuit
noted, private schools have standing to assert the rights of their students.171
Similarly, the court of appeals reasoned, “the interests of the States’
universities . . . are aligned with their students.”172 Moreover, the work of
their faculty members was necessary for the running of the university,
giving the states third-party standing to assert the rights of faculty denied

162. See id.
163. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
164. Id. at 1159–60.
165. Id. at 1161.
166. Id. at 1161 n.5.
167. Id. at 1161 (“We therefore conclude that the States have alleged harms to
their proprietary interests traceable to the Executive Order.”).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1160; see also id. at 1167–68 (reserving consideration of equal
protection claim on the merits until it had been fully briefed).
170. See id. at 1158–61 (affording the state third-party standing without
discussing “special solicitude” under Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
171. See id. at 1160 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 & n.13 (1976)).
172. Id.
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entry under the ban.173 As proprietors of their public universities, the states
had third-party standing to challenge the travel ban on the same terms as a
private university might have.174
On the merits, the states’ suit challenged the Trump Administration’s
travel ban on several grounds, including religious discrimination.175 Prior
to the executive order announcing the first travel ban, the President had
made “numerous statements . . . about his intent to implement a ‘Muslim
ban.’”176 As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump repeatedly “equated
Islam with terrorism,” including with the flat assertion that “‘Islam hates
us.’”177 Although the Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the religious
discrimination claim in its initial decision in Washington v. Trump,178 the
state had standing to raise it, and the President’s stigmatization of Muslims
remained a central piece of subsequent state litigation challenging
subsequent iterations of the travel ban, including under the Establishment
Clause.179 Just as Puerto Rico sought to challenge “[d]eliberate efforts to
stigmatize the labor force as inferior” in Snapp,180 so too did the states seek
to challenge a policy that was based upon stigmatization and “apparent
hostility toward the Islamic faith.”181 But while Snapp premised state
standing on quasi-sovereign interests, the travel ban litigation underscores
173. Id.
174. See id. (citing cases involving private schools).
175. See id. at 1167.
176. See id.
177. Caroline Mala Corbin, Essay: Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never
White: At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 455, 476 (2017).
178. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1168.
179. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that record of adoption of various travel bans “paints a . . .
harrowing picture, from which a reasonable observer would readily conclude that
the Proclamation was motivated by hostility and animus towards the Muslim
faith”). But see id. at 2418 (majority op.) (stating that “issue before us is not
whether to denounce the [President’s] statements” and concluding that final
iteration of travel ban had a “sufficient national security justification to survive
rational basis review”).
180. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365,
370 (4th Cir. 1980), aff’d sub. nom. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 609 (1982).
181. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Hawai‘i
v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1126 (D. Haw. 2017) (“Plaintiffs assert that by
singling out nationals from the six predominantly Muslim countries, the Executive
Order causes harm by stigmatizing not only immigrants and refugees, but also
Muslim citizens of the United States.”).
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that the possibilities for state standing for equality are much broader than
that, and encompass cases in which a state seeks standing based upon the
same doctrines that might support private standing to sue.
B. Sovereign Standing to Enforce Equality Law
In other cases, however, a state may claim its own sovereign standing
to enforce equality law. In Hawaii v. Trump, for example, the State of
Hawaii challenged President Donald Trump’s second ban on travel from
several Muslim-majority countries.182 Hawaii argued that it had standing
on several bases, including proprietary interests as well as its “sovereign
interests in carrying out its refugee policies” and implementing its “laws
protecting equal rights, barring discrimination, and fostering diversity.”183
The Ninth Circuit held that the state had Article III standing based upon
its proprietary interests in operating the University of Hawai‘i.184 But the
court of appeals also went beyond the standing doctrines that would apply
to private proprietors to conclude the state had standing as a sovereign to
challenge the travel ban.185
According to the state, the Trump Administration’s travel ban
interfered with Hawaii’s sovereign interest in implementing its refugee
policies and equality laws by resettling refugees within Hawaii.186 The
Ninth Circuit held that these allegations sufficed to give the state standing
to seek a preliminary injunction against the travel ban, reasoning that:
A State has an interest in its “exercise of sovereign power over
individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction,” which
“involves the power to create and enforce a legal code.” [Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982).] The State contends that [the executive order banning
travel] hinders the exercise of its sovereign power to enforce its
laws and policies and this inflicts an injury sufficient to provide
the State standing to challenge the Order. The State has laws
protecting equal rights, barring discrimination, and fostering
diversity. . . . Specific to refugees, the State created the Office of
Community Services (“OCS”), which is directed to “[a]ssist and
182. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
183. Id. at 765.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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coordinate the efforts of all public and private agencies providing
services which affect the disadvantaged, refugees, and
immigrants.” . . .
As the State exercises “sovereign power over individuals and
entities within the relevant jurisdiction” in administering OCS, we
conclude, at this preliminary stage, that the State has made
sufficient allegations to support standing to challenge the refugeerelated provisions of [the executive order banning travel]. See
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601.187
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning pulls on several strands of the Snapp
Court’s analysis. As in Washington v. Trump,188 the state of Hawaii sought
to challenge federal executive action that stigmatized and subordinated
Muslims as a disfavored group.189 In Hawaii v. Trump, the Ninth Circuit
pointed to a state’s unique sovereign status as a basis for standing to sue.190
The court’s reasoning drew not upon Snapp’s discussion of a state’s quasisovereign interest in combatting discrimination, but instead upon Snapp’s
dictum that a state has a judicially-cognizable sovereign interest in making
and enforcing its own laws. Such an interest was at stake in Hawaii v.
Trump, the court of appeals reasoned, because, as in Snapp itself, the state
had created an agency tasked with addressing the problem that the state
sought to address through federal litigation. This reasoning picks up on the
Snapp Court’s connection between equality and public administration.191
Hawaii’s administration of its own laws through OCS established, or at
least supported, its standing to sue, much as Puerto Rico’s administration
of its own laws through its Department of Labor supported its standing in
Snapp, or so the Ninth Circuit reasoned.192
187. Id. (internal citations omitted).
188. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
189. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text.
190. Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 765.
191. See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text.
192. In Snapp, Puerto Rico’s Department of Labor “participate[d] directly in
the operation of the federal employment scheme” under which Puerto Rico had
sued. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610
(1982). The Ninth Circuit did not discuss whether the State of Hawaii’s OCS
similarly participated in the administration of federal programs concerning
refugee resettlement, although it concluded that the state’s sovereign interest was
within the zone of interests protected by the refugee admission provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. See Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 766; see also infra
notes 258–263 and accompanying text (discussing normative importance of
state’s direct participation in federal regime for state standing analysis).
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C. Quasi-Sovereign Standing for Equality
States have also relied on Snapp’s discussion of a state’s quasisovereign interest in combatting discrimination, sometimes reading it for
all it may be worth. Claims of quasi-sovereign state standing have
appeared in both the travel ban litigation and litigation concerning the
Trump Administration’s ban on openly transgender individuals’ military
service.
In Aziz v. Trump, the Commonwealth of Virginia sued to challenge the
Trump Administration’s first travel ban from a number of Muslimmajority countries.193 Virginia brought claims based upon equal
protection, the First Amendment, and the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act, among others, alleging in particular that the individual
rights of at least 300 people were at stake.194 Based on these allegations, a
federal district court concluded that Virginia had standing.195 Specifically,
the state pled a sufficient interest in “‘secur[ing] its residents from the
harmful effects of discrimination.’”196
As the district court saw it, Virginia’s allegations presented a
“textbook” case for quasi-sovereign standing under Snapp.197 As in Snapp,
the state sought to challenge discriminatory subordination.198 In that sense,
at least, Virginia’s quasi-sovereign interest mirrored the interest that
supported Puerto Rico’s standing to sue. The district court went on to
reason that “as in Snapp,” so too in this case, “the stigma of discrimination
‘carr[ied] a universal sting.’”199 But while an antisubordination
understanding would help explain how discrimination against some Puerto
Ricans would stigmatize all Puerto Ricans, it is less clear in what sense
discrimination against Muslims would stigmatize all Virginians, Muslim
and non-Muslim alike. And in this sense, Aziz may not have been a
textbook case for quasi-sovereign standing under Snapp. The district court
in Aziz seemed to extend Snapp’s rationale to suggest that a state has a
substantial interest in assuring all its residents, including those who are not
members of the disfavored group facing discrimination, that it will act to
address discriminatory subordination.
193. Aziz v. Trump, 231 F. Supp. 3d 23, 27 (E.D. Va. 2017).
194. Id. at 32.
195. Id.
196. Id (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609).
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 175–181 (analyzing Trump Administration’s travel bans
under antisubordination theory of equality).
199. Aziz, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 32 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. at 609)).
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In Karnoski v. Trump, by contrast, the federal district court premised a
state’s quasi-sovereign standing solely upon the state’s interest in protecting
members of the subordinated group.200 In that case, the State of Washington
asserted several bases for standing in seeking to intervene in a private
lawsuit challenging the Trump Administration’s ban of transgender
individuals from military service.201 The Administration’s policy would
have required the discharge of openly transgender individuals, denied them
an opportunity to join the military, and prohibited the use of particular
federal funds for certain medical procedures for transgender individuals.202
Transgender individuals undoubtedly had standing to challenge the ban as
unlawful discrimination.203 The federal district court concluded that
Washington also had standing to challenge the ban.204 In asserting standing
to sue, the state pointed to its uniquely sovereign interests, specifically its
interests in constituting the Washington National Guard and in “maintaining
and enforcing its own anti-discrimination laws.”205 In addition, the state
pointed to a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting transgender individuals
from discrimination.206 The district court concluded that Washington had a
quasi-sovereign interest in ‘“securing residents from the harmful effects of
discrimination.”’207 More particularly, Washington had a quasi-sovereign
interest in “protecting its transgender residents from a discriminatory
policy.”208 Such discrimination, the district court pointed out, has been
“systemic” in the United States,209 and the state’s standing permitted it to

200. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-01297MJP, 2017 WL 5668071, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 27, 2017).
201. See id.
202. Id. at *1.
203. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-01297MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 11, 2017).
204. Id. at *6.
205. Karnoski, 2017 WL 5668071, at *3 (determining that such interests
sufficed for purposes of intervention in the suit); see Karnoski, 2017 WL
6311305, at *6 (holding that these sovereign interests sufficed for Article III
standing); Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *9
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018) (same).
206. Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at *6.
207. Id. at *6 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel.
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 609 (1982)).
208. See also Karnoski, 2017 WL 5668071, at *2; Karnoski, 2018 WL
1784464, at *9 (explaining that “Washington is also home to approximately
32,850 transgender adults, and its laws protect these residents against
discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, and gender identity”).
209. See Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *10.
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challenge the Trump Administration’s perpetuation of that systemic
subordination of transgender people.
Taken together, Aziz and Karnoski both reflect Snapp’s discussion of
a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in combatting subordination and raise
questions about its scope. Snapp’s substantive vision of federalism and
equality law continues in the contemporary cases of state standing for
equality. Federalism, in this vision, entails a substantial state interest in
combatting discriminatory subordination. As the more recent cases attest,
moreover, states are not limited to litigating quasi-sovereign interests
when they seek to stand for equality in federal court. The multiple potential
bases for state standing for equality complicate the doctrinal and
normative analysis, raising questions about the future of state standing for
equality.
III. THE FUTURE OF STATE STANDING FOR EQUALITY
This Part argues that the future of state standing for equality may be
driven by the ways in which states frame their judicially cognizable
interests in combatting discrimination. State standing for equality,
particularly of the quasi-sovereign variety in Snapp, faces doctrinal
headwinds. For one, the Court has moved considerably far from the
antisubordination understanding of equality law. States standing for
equality have tended to bring suits that would benefit members of
subordinated groups, rather than suits that would benefit members of the
majority based upon an anticlassification understanding, such as suits that
challenge affirmative action or allege reverse discrimination. For another
doctrinal headwind, the standing of states to sue the federal government
based upon quasi-sovereign interests remains unsettled. The Court is more
likely to permit states to stand for equality when the case is framed in terms
of proprietary or sovereign standing. Snapp’s framing of state standing for
equality in terms of quasi-sovereign interests may not be the future of state
standing of equality, even if its substantive vision of federalism and
equality law continues to support state litigation to combat discrimination.
The goal of this Part is not to resolve all the doctrinal and normative
questions arising from state standing for equality,210 but instead to focus
210. This Part does not, for example, address whether a state may stand for its
residents in parens patriae only when those residents are unable “to obtain
complete relief without intervention by the sovereign,” an important question for
the future of state standing for equality. Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L.
Snapp & Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1980). Elsewhere I have argued
for some limitations on the power of states to substitute themselves for their
residents in the enforcement of private rights, particularly under federal law where
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upon how the framing of the state’s interest may determine doctrinal
prospects.211 This Part first discusses the doctrinal headwinds facing state
standing for equality and then assesses the importance of framing for its
prospects. It concludes by discussing the possibility that much as concerns
about antisubordination have become “disguised, qualified, and bounded”
in equal protection jurisprudence,212 so too may they be embedded within
a standing jurisprudence that pushes states to frame litigation on behalf of
subordinated groups in terms that do not refer to that subordination
directly.
A. Doctrinal Headwinds
State standing for equality faces doctrinal headwinds both in terms of
the doctrine’s substantive understanding of equality law and its reliance
on quasi-sovereign interests to support standing to sue.

Congress has not authorized parens patriae litigation. See Davis, supra note 17,
at 40–47.
Nor does this Part address the important question whether limits on
parens patriae standing in suits against the federal government are constitutional
or prudential. See, e.g., Maryland People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (concluding that limits are prudential). I address that
question in Davis, supra note 152, at 64–65.
Finally, this Part does not fully explore the limits on states’ standing to
sue in a sovereign capacity against the federal government. Some cases involving
state standing for equality push the boundaries of existing doctrine. In Hawaii v.
Trump, for example, the Ninth Circuit adverted to the state’s sovereign interest in
its “laws protecting equal rights, barring discrimination, and fostering diversity”
as a basis for standing to sue. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 765 (9th Cir. 2017).
Under well-established law, a state would have standing to defend its equality
laws against attack in federal court. See Grove, supra note 15, at 858 (discussing
“background principle[] . . . that a sovereign government must have standing to
enforce and defend its laws in court”). But Hawaii v. Trump was not a case in
which the state’s equality law was on trial, and there are powerful arguments that
a state should not be able to sue simply because federal law conflicts with a policy
declared in state law. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d
253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011). In my view, Hawaii’s standing depended upon its
proprietary interests and the normal rules for third-party standing.
211. Richard Primus has explored a similar doctrinal and normative inquiry
regarding the future of disparate impact. See Richard Primus, The Future of
Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1346–47 (2010).
212. Siegel, supra note 18, at 1547.
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1. The Shift from Antisubordination to Anticlassification
The Supreme Court decided Snapp in 1982, during roughly the same
period it was moving away from an antisubordination understanding of
equal protection towards an anticlassification understanding. On the
standard history, that shift began in the 1970s.213 In 1978, the Court split
over the lawfulness of affirmative action in higher education, applying
strict scrutiny to the University of California, Davis School of Medicine’s
special admissions program that aimed to increase the number of members
of historically underrepresented groups admitted to the school.214 Justice
Lewis Powell “supplied the crucial fifth vote in Bakke to reject an
antisubordination (or ‘two-class’) reading of the Equal Protection
Clause.”215 Justice Byron White, also the author of Court’s opinion in
Snapp, penned a concurring opinion questioning whether Title VI
“create[d] a stricter standard of color blindness than the Constitution itself
requires” and arguing that the statute did not imply a private right of
action, 216 while also joining an opinion by Justice Brennan concluding that
the Davis Medical School’s affirmative action program was
constitutional.217 Justice White’s apparent comfort with an
antisubordination understanding in Bakke and Snapp is not easy to square
with his 1976 opinion for the Court in Washington v. Davis,218 which held
that plaintiffs must demonstrate discriminatory intent to prove racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.219 Snapp’s discussion
of a state’s interest in combatting discriminatory subordination appeared
when the antisubordination understanding of equality law was already,
like the Owl of Minerva, “‘passing into history.’”220

213. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 18, at 10 (“A fairly standard story about
the development of antidiscrimination jurisprudence since the 1970s argues that
the views of [Owen] Fiss and other antisubordination theorists were rejected by
the U.S. Supreme Court, which adopted a contrary and inconsistent theory of
equality. . . . sometimes called the anticlassification or antidifferentiation
principle.”).
214. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295–97 (1978).
215. Siegel, supra note 104, at 1292.
216. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 385 (White, J., concurring).
217. See id. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
218. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1976).
219. See Lance Liebman, Justice White and Affirmative Action, 58 U. COLO.
L. REV. 471, 476–80 (1987) (discussing evolution of Justice White’s thinking).
220. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs,
and the Politics of Denial, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1585 (1993) (citing T.M. Knox,

2018]

STATE STANDING FOR EQUALITY

181

Today, talk of state standing for equality may be apt to conjure the
Court’s discussion of a state’s interest in combatting antidiscrimination
law on the grounds that it offends the equal sovereignty of the states. In
Shelby County v. Holder, the Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights
Act (“VRA”) violated the “equal sovereignty” of the states subjected to
the preclearance requirements of Section 5.221 The Court emphasized the
“great strides” it believed America had made in combatting racial
discrimination.222 The Shelby County Court’s seeming perception that
racial minorities have adequate access to the political process cuts against
an antisubordination understanding and in favor of anticlassification
understanding of the wrongs that equality law should now address.223
It is not clear what work Snapp’s account of state standing has to do
in a world where anticlassification is the harm that equality law addresses.
One could imagine, of course, that one state might sue another based on
an allegation of an impermissible classification, bringing, for example, a
parens patriae suit to challenge alleged reverse discrimination. Imagine,
for example, one state suing to challenge the affirmative action policies of
another state’s higher education system. But the cases have not followed
that pattern, and for good reason. The anticlassification understanding
focuses upon individualized harms.224 According to Snapp, such harms do
not suffice to make out a quasi-sovereign interest for parens patriae
standing.225 As the Court put it, “[i]nterests of private parties are obviously
not in themselves sovereign interests,” and in order to enjoy parens patriae
standing, a state “must articulate an interest apart from the interests of
particular private parties.”226 Such quasi-sovereign interests exist, Snapp
explained, when a state challenges discriminatory actions that cause not
only individualized harm, but also injury to “a sufficiently substantial
segment of [the state’s] population.”227 Quasi-sovereign standing is keyed
Translator’s Foreward, in GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT 13 (T.M. Knox ed. & trans., 1957)).
221. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
222. Id. at 549.
223. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and
Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2
of the VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1598–99 (2018).
224. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
225. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 602 (1982).
226. Id. at 602, 607.
227. See id. at 607 (explaining that “more must be alleged than injury to an
identifiable group of individual residents” and that “the State [must] allege[]
injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population”).
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to group harms in ways that resonate with an antisubordination
understanding of discrimination but not with an anticlassification
understanding.228
The shift from an antisubordination to an anticlassification
understanding of discrimination has coincided with increasing conservatism
on the Supreme Court, beginning with the Burger Court and continuing on
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.229 Bertrall Ross has argued that the cases
evince less a shift from antisubordination to anticlassification than a
reorientation of the Court’s understanding of subordination and the
political process: “Group-based domination and subordination, according
to the new conservative construction of the Equal Protection Clause, [are]
no longer shaped by a long history of racial oppression, but instead
determined by the current political context.”230 In this reoriented
understanding, the current political context may suggest that racial, or
other, minorities have captured the political process to engage in selfdealing.231 From that perspective of “renewed distrust” of the political
process,232 the recent examples of state standing for equality, including the
travel ban and sanctuary city litigation, may suggest that states are not due
solicitude when they seek to challenge discrimination against historically
disadvantaged minorities. Rather, judicial suspicion of a state attorney
general’s decision to sue might be warranted, much as the Roberts Court
thought suspicion of Congress was warranted in Shelby County.233

228. To the extent that an anticlassification understanding is compatible with
concerns with group harm, this point has less force. Paul Brest attempted to combine
the two in Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1976), but as Ian Haney López has pointed out, “[w]edding
an anticlassification stance to a concern with group harm introduced core
instabilities into [Brest’s] article.” Haney López, supra note 131, at 1058.
229. See, e.g, Ross, supra note 18, at 1597.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 1605 (arguing that Court’s suspicion of affirmative action
programs “reflected a conservative concern that racial minorities were engaging
in a form of self-dealing that was unaccountable to the pluralist marketplace [of
politics]”).
232. Id. at 1565.
233. Cf. id. at 1632–33 (discussing public choice critique that would suggest
Shelby County was rightly decided because the Voting Rights Act “insofar as it
protects the representational rights of minority groups, . . . merely heightens
advantages that members of these groups already have in the political process”).
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2. The Unsettled Law of Quasi-Sovereign Standing
Chief Justice Roberts has already laid the doctrinal groundwork for
judicial suspicion of quasi-sovereign standing, particularly where a state
sues the federal government.234 Much of the normative debate surrounding
state standing law today concerns whether states should be due “special
solicitude in [the] standing analysis,” as Massachusetts v. EPA put it.235
Dissenting from the Court’s judgment in that case, Chief Justice Roberts
suggested that states might be due special disfavor in the standing analysis.
He argued that “our cases cast significant doubt on a State’s standing to
assert a quasi-sovereign interest—as opposed to a direct injury—against
the Federal Government.”236 In any event, the Chief Justice reasoned, a
state must show that its citizens have suffered an Article III injury in their
own right and many not sue simply to espouse its citizens’ rights.237
Thus, the law concerning quasi-sovereign standing remains unsettled.
Some scholars have argued that states are due special solicitude when they
sue in a representative capacity because state attorneys general “are
constrained by substantial fetters of political accountability.”238 But it is
precisely responsiveness to historically disadvantaged minorities that
might lead an increasingly conservative Roberts Court to view state
standing for equality with suspicion.239
At a minimum, Snapp itself insists that there must be a distinction
between simply espousing a private individual’s rights, which a state lacks
standing to do, and litigating quasi-sovereign interests as a parens patriae
representative of the state’s residents, which a state may have standing to
pursue.240 Although Snapp does not elaborate the reasons for drawing such
a distinction, the Court’s third-party standing cases suggest two possible
concerns. First, “the courts should not adjudicate [individual] rights
unnecessarily, and it may be that, in fact, the holders of those rights either
do not wish to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of
whether the in-court litigant is successful or not.”241 Second, “third parties
234. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
235. See id. at 520 (majority op.).
236. See id. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 538–39.
238. Massey, supra note 17, at 284.
239. See supra notes 229–233 and accompanying text.
240. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
607 (1982) (requiring state to articulate a “quasi-sovereign interest” distinct from
the interests of specific private parties when it seeks to sue in parens patriae).
241. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976).
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themselves will usually be the best proponents of their own rights.”242 In
addition, the Court’s decision in Mellon provides support for denying
standing when a state seeks to sue the federal government as a
representative of a third party’s rights.243 As a matter of principle, the
Mellon rule is best explained by reference to concerns about states
encroaching on matters that are best left to the national political
branches.244
It is unclear how much of the Mellon rule survived the majority’s
opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, which permitted the State of
Massachusetts to litigate quasi-sovereign interests against a federal
agency.245 But some recent examples of state standing for equality push
the boundaries of Snapp and Massachusetts v. EPA in ways that are
especially vulnerable to objections based upon Mellon. According to
Virginia’s theory of standing in Aziz v. Trump, for example, a state has
quasi-sovereign standing whenever it alleges that the federal government
has violated the individual rights of an arguably non-trivial number of
individuals—in that case, it was 300 individuals.246 The normal third-party
standing rules that apply to private litigants would not support standing on
that basis without a special relationship between the litigant and the third
parties whose rights are at stake.247 Therefore, to grant the state standing
in Aziz is to afford it special solicitude to represent its residents in suits
against the federal government. Whether Snapp stretches that far is fairly
debatable, if for no other reason than Snapp did not entail litigation against
the federal government. The same objection that applied to state standing
in Mellon might apply to quasi-sovereign standing in Aziz v. Trump—it is
a theory of quasi-sovereign standing that knows no limit and raises a
serious risk of transforming the litigation of equality law into pitched
battles between states and the federal government.
By contrast, the law concerning proprietary and sovereign standing is
more settled. Federal courts have long granted states proprietary standing
on the same terms as private parties, including in cases against the federal
government.248 The law has also generally come to accept sovereign
standing for states,249 although some scholars have argued that the Court
242. Id. at 114.
243. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
244. See id. at 485–86.
245. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
246. See Aziz v. Trump, 231 F. Supp. 3d 23, 32 (E.D. Va. 2017).
247. See Singleton, 428 U.S. 106, 114–16.
248. See Davis, supra note 17, at 17–18.
249. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458
U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (discussing states’ sovereign interests); Grove, supra note
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has gone too far to permit states to embroil the federal judiciary in
answering abstract questions about the allocation of authority between the
states and the federal government.250
B. The Importance of Framing
The future of state standing equality may depend upon how states
frame their interest. Recent litigation underscores that Snapp’s substantive
vision of a state’s interest in combatting discrimination need not be framed
simply in quasi-sovereign terms, but may also, in many cases, be
understood in proprietary or sovereign terms, including in controversial
cases against the federal government. Under conditions of contemporary
federalism, state and federal governance is deeply intertwined, and federal
actions that may perpetuate discrimination against historically
disadvantaged minorities may also inflict proprietary or sovereign injuries
on the states.
The point can be illustrated with proprietary cases, such as
Washington v. Trump,251 as well as cases that involve sovereign interests
and financial harms. Consider again County of Santa Clara.252 In that case,
the county sued to vindicate its Tenth Amendment rights against the
Trump Administration, which, the county argued, was attempting to
commandeer and coerce it into implementing the Administration’s
deportation policy by threatening it with the withdrawal of federal funding.
The country argued that “truly local” matters were at stake, as it wanted to
disentangle its law enforcement resources and devote them to other
efforts.253 This argument seems precisely the sort that a state or its
subdivision should bring in federal court.
Under current doctrine, a state, or its subdivision, has justiciable
interests under the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment prevents
the federal government from commandeering or coercing the states into
accepting conditions on federal spending.254 States have standing to raise
anti-commandeering and anti-coercion claims.255 Such standing is
15, at 854–55 (arguing that precedent supports state standing when states “seek to
enforce or defend state law”).
250. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 230.
251. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); see supra notes
160–181 (discussing Washington v. Trump).
252. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
253. See id. at 511 (describing the county’s policies).
254. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 187–88 (1992).
255. See Davis, supra note 17, at 72–73.
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consistent with the text of the Tenth Amendment, which expressly reserves
“powers . . . to the States.”256 A state is likely to be an effective litigant of
the underlying merits issues that concern state sovereignty; indeed, the
state may be the most effective litigant.257
When a state, or its subdivision, sues on a Tenth Amendment claim
that happens to vindicate equality values, the most powerful objection to
standing is a general one: states should not have standing to litigate Tenth
Amendment claims because of the potential adverse consequences. These
adverse consequences could include embroiling the judiciary in abstract
political battles. This objection, however, is unrelated to the possibility
that the state’s suit would vindicate equality values. Instead, this objection
could be leveled at any suit in which the state seeks to litigate its sovereign
interests, including suits such as Shelby County that challenge
antidiscrimination law.
Washington State’s challenge to the Trump Administration’s ban on
openly transgender individuals in the military provides another example
of sovereign standing for equality. In Perpich v. Department of Defense,
the Court permitted a state to sue the federal government under the Militia
Clauses of Article I, Section 8, which authorize Congress to provide for
“organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia” while “reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”258
The Militia Clauses afforded the state a sovereign interest in challenging
federal regulation of the National Guard.259
In Karnoski v. Trump, the district court ultimately focused upon the
state’s sovereign interest in the National Guard in concluding that
Washington could sue to challenge the Trump Administration’s ban on
openly transgender individuals serving in the military.260 Though the court
did not point to Perpich, it reasoned that the state had a judicially
cognizable sovereign interest because the ban would interfere with the
state’s “recruitment efforts and day-to-day command over Guard members
in training and most forms of active duty,” as well as the state’s interest in
ensuring that “the Guard conforms to both federal and state laws and
regulations, including the state’s anti-discrimination laws.”261 As in
256. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
257. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 17, at 1440.
258. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 337 & n.3 (1990) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16).
259. See id. at 336 (stating question presented on the merits).
260. See Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *9
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018).
261. See id. at *9.
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Perpich, so too in Karnoski did the state’s sovereign interest support
standing.
Comparing Karnoski with Snapp is instructive on the importance of
framing the state’s interest. In Snapp, the Supreme Court noted “the fact
that the Commonwealth participates directly in the operation of the federal
employment scheme,” concluding that this participation made Puerto
Rico’s quasi-sovereign interest “even more compelling.”262 Thus, Puerto
Rico’s sovereign interest in public administration was a plus factor in the
parens patriae analysis. Karnoski suggests that states may, in some cases,
instead frame their standing for equality in sovereign terms, with quasisovereign concerns playing the plus factor role.263
Stepping back from the doctrinal details, we might see this sort of shift
from quasi-sovereign to sovereign or proprietary standing as emblematic
of a larger story about the antisubordination understanding of equality law.
Reva Siegel has argued that the history of equal protection jurisprudence
shows that “antisubordination and anticlassification are friends as well as
agonists.”264 While there have been discernible shifts in understanding and
emphasis, as well as the emergence of alternatives to the binary between
antisubordination and anticlassification, “concerns about group
subordination are at the heart of the modern equal protection tradition,”
even as “such concerns have been persistently disguised, qualified, and
bounded.”265 Thus, as Siegel has put it with co-author Jack Balkin,
“antisubordination values have played and continue to play a key role in
shaping what the anticlassification principle means in practice.”266 What
is framed in anticlassification terms may very well vindicate values of
antisubordination.
Like equality law, standing law has shifted over time in response to
political and social contestation. And like equality law, the law of state
standing for equality may come to embed concerns about antisubordination
within frames that do not name the concern. Perhaps the result will be
nothing more than a “word game played by secret rules,”267 one in which
state attorneys general find the frame that will sustain state standing for
equality in an era where the assumptions of Snapp no longer hold.

262. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
610 (1982).
263. See Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *9 (focusing upon enumerating
several sovereign interests that sufficed for standing).
264. Siegel, supra note 18, at 1477.
265. Id. at 1547.
266. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 18, at 13.
267. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Even so, games shed light on the societies that play them. In 1982, the
Court treated Puerto Rico as a state with a quasi-sovereign interest in
combatting discriminatory subordination.268 Today, not only the Court,269
but also the federal executive branch,270 have made clear that Puerto Rico
is not a state. But the principle embodied in Snapp remains part of our
jurisprudence, one worth remembering, especially today.271
CONCLUSION
Understanding Snapp as an equality law case complicates typical
stories about the relationship between constitutional structure and
individual rights. Contests over the legacy of Snapp are contests over the
meaning of our federalism and contests over the meaning of our
commitments to equality under law. The future of state standing for
equality may depend upon whether states frame Snapp’s substantive
vision of federalism in ways that are likely to fit within a changed
landscape of social meaning around state standing to vindicate the public
interest in combatting discrimination.272

268. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 608 n.15 (1982).
269. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2016) (holding
that Puerto Rico, unlike a state, is not a sovereign separate from the United States
for double-jeopardy purposes).
270. See, e.g., Danny Vink, How Trump Favored Texas Over Puerto Rico,
POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/27/donaldtrump-fema-hurricane-maria-response-480557 [https://perma.cc/P5FN-9WVA].
271. See generally Peter S. Green, Puerto Rico’s Grim Prognosis: The Island
May Never Recover, CBS NEWS (Sep. 21, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news
/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-by-the-numbers-cbsn-originals/ [https://perma.cc/2
V7P-D75A].
272. See Davis, supra note 152 (discussing the “new public standing” doctrine
affording states standing to bring public actions in federal court).

